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GAAR in Action: An Empirical Exploration 
of Tax Court of Canada Cases (1997-2009) 
and Judicial Decision Making
Jinyan Li and Thaddeus Hwong*
(with the Honourable Donald G.H. Bowman, Pablo Caballero, Lemuel 
Chan, Jennifer Pocock, Shimshon Posen, and Sarah Templeton)**
P r é c i s
Cet article présente une modeste étude empirique exploratoire de l’application de la 
règle générale anti-évitement du Canada (rGae). L’étude examine l’ensemble des causes 
relatives à la rGae tranchées par la Cour canadienne de l’impôt au cours de la période de 
1997 à 2009, ainsi que certains attributs personnels et sociétaux des juges qui ont rendu 
ces décisions. Les constatations permettent de formuler trois conclusions provisoires. 
Premièrement, la rGae a contribué à faire changer la donne, quoique modestement, en ce 
qui a trait à l’approche des tribunaux dans les causes d’évitement fiscal. Deuxièmement, 
bien qu’un degré élevé d’incertitude demeure concernant l’application de la rGae, il 
semble se dessiner une constance dans les décisions judiciaires. Troisièmement, tout 
porte à croire que certaines décisions sur la rGae s’appuient sur des critères « au 
pifomètre »; en particulier, la prise de décisions judiciaires dans les affaires relatives à la 
rGae semble avoir été influencée par les attributs des juges, notamment l’expérience à la 
Cour canadienne de l’impôt, le sexe, l’expérience avant la nomination et les liens 
régionaux. Puisque les ensembles de données examinés dans l’étude sont très petits, 
ces constatations ne sont nullement concluantes. Néanmoins, il est à espérer qu’elles 
aideront à faire progresser la compréhension empirique de l’application de la rGae.
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valuable insights, most of which have been incorporated into the final version.
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A b s t r A c t
This article presents a modest, exploratory empirical study of Canada’s general anti-
avoidance rule (Gaar) in action. The study examines the entire body of Gaar cases 
decided by the Tax Court of Canada in the period 1997-2009, as well as certain personal 
and societal attributes of the judges who decided these cases. The findings support 
three tentative conclusions. First, Gaar has been a game changer, albeit a modest one, 
with respect to the courts’ approach to tax-avoidance cases. Second, while considerable 
uncertainty remains with respect to the application of Gaar, a pattern in judicial decisions 
appears to be emerging. Third, there are indications that a judicial smell test is at play in 
some Gaar decisions; in particular, judicial decision making in Gaar cases appears to 
have been influenced by the judge’s attributes, including experience on the Tax Court, 
gender, preappointment experience, and regional ties. Because the data sets examined 
in the study are very small, these findings are by no means conclusive. Nevertheless, the 
hope is that they will help to advance empirical understanding of Gaar in action.
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intro duc tio n—e x Plo ring g A A r using 
c A se A nd Judici A l  At tribute s
Canada enacted a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), as section 245 of the Income 
Tax Act,1 in 1988. Since then, the courts have addressed on numerous occasions the 
interpretation of the GAAR provisions and the circumstances in which the rule may 
apply. This article presents a modest, exploratory empirical study of GAAR in action. 
We analyze the body of GAAR cases decided by the Tax Court of Canada in the years 
1997-2009, as well as personal and societal attributes of the judges involved that may 
have influenced their decision making. We focus on three main research questions:
1. Has GAAR been a game changer in terms of how the courts approach tax-
avoidance cases?
2. Notwithstanding the inherent uncertainty in the legislation, are any ele-
ments of certainty emerging in the courts’ application of GAAR?
3. Is there a judicial smell test in GAAR cases?
The research was conducted by students enrolled in the tax law colloquium (winter 
2011) in the JD program at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, under the 
supervision of Jinyan Li, Thaddeus Hwong, and Donald G. Bowman, a former 
judge and chief justice of the Tax Court of Canada.
The study was motivated by several factors. We were intrigued by the intended 
role of GAAR and how it has played out in reality. If tax planning is analogized to a 
card game between taxpayers and the government, the government’s cards are all on 
the table, face up, but one of those cards—GAAR—is a trump card. The rules for 
playing this card are not entirely clear; essentially, the government may use it at its 
discretion. The referee of the game (the court) has to make a call from time to time 
as to whether the use of the card is appropriate. This scenario prompts a number of 
questions. How have the courts made the calls? To what extent has the game been 
changed by GAAR? While these issues have been much debated in the literature 
from a normative perspective, we were curious about the usefulness of empirical 
research methodology in answering these questions. Finally, we wanted to extract 
whatever lessons can be learned from the experience of Donald Bowman, who 
played a pivotal role in developing the Canadian GAAR jurisprudence, and in par-
ticular to test his views about a judicial smell test in GAAR cases.
red Flags for Gaar 362
appeals of Tax Court Decisions 364
Sketching the Big Picture While Looking Forward 365
1 RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (herein referred to as “the Act”). Unless otherwise 
stated, statutory references in this article are to the Act.
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The scope of the research is modest, since the Tax Court decided only 37 GAAR 
cases during the study period. As the first of its kind, the study explores the possible 
connection between the personal and societal attributes of the judges and the case 
outcomes. The research methodology is exploratory, and the data set is small. Selected 
variables are applied in a statistical analysis of the data. Since the GAAR jurispru-
dence is evolving and only Tax Court cases are covered, the findings offer only an 
initial snapshot. They do, however, suggest that despite the inherent uncertainty of 
the GAAR provisions, elements of certainty are emerging in the jurisprudence. GAAR 
is a game changer in this context, especially when the effect of the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in Canada Trustco2 is considered. The findings also seem to 
corroborate former justice Bowman’s sense of a judicial smell test.
We hope to add to the literature on GAAR, which to date has been primarily 
doctrinal and normative. For that purpose, we hope that our statistical analysis of the 
jurisprudence and our main findings can advance understanding of GAAR in action. 
We also hope to offer some takeaway points that will be useful to lawyers who are 
involved in litigating GAAR cases and to tax advisers who are asked to give opinions 
on the potential application of GAAR.
Following this brief introduction, the second section of the article provides the 
context for the research project by reviewing the existing literature on GAAR and 
presenting an overview of empirical legal studies. The third section describes the 
research data sets and methodology, and explains the choice of cases and variables. 
The fourth section reports the findings and the conclusions on the three main re-
search questions. The fifth section highlights the limitations of the research and 
suggests some implications of the findings for litigators and tax advisers, as well as 
for the judicial appointment process. The sixth and concluding section comments 
briefly on some of the lessons learned about GAAR and about empirical legal re-
search as a scholarly endeavour.
co nte x t—liter At ure o n g A A r 
A nd emPiric A l  leg A l  s t udie s
The body of existing literature on the Canadian GAAR includes books3 and articles 
in academic journals;4 articles by legal scholars and practitioners published by the 
 2 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54. 
 3 For example, David G. Duff and Harry Erlichman, eds., Tax Avoidance in Canada After Canada 
Trustco and Mathew (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007); Nathalie Goyette, Countering Tax Treaty 
Abuses: A Canadian Perspective on an International Issue (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 
1999); William I. Innes, Patrick J. Boyle, and Joel A. Nitikman, The Essential GAAR Manual: 
Policies, Principles and Procedures (Toronto: CCH, 2006); Gilles Larin and Robert Duong, 
Effective Responses to Aggressive Tax Planning: What Canada Can Learn from Other Jurisdictions, 
Canadian Tax Paper no. 112 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2009); Alan M. Schwartz, 
François Barette, Paul Cabana, Anna Dayan, Paul F. Monahan, Alain Ranger, Peter W. Vair, 
and Kevin Yip, GAAR Interpreted: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule (Toronto: Carswell, 2006); 
(Footnotes 3 and 4 are continued on the next page.)
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Canadian Tax Foundation, covering the history and application of GAAR;5 annual 
reviews of GAAR cases;6 and commentary on decisions in individual cases since Canada 
Vern Krishna, Tax Avoidance: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule (Toronto: Carswell, 1990); David 
G. Duff, Benjamin Alarie, Kim Brooks, Geoffrey Loomer, and Lisa Philipps, Canadian Income 
Tax Law, 4th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2012), chapter 3; Tim Edgar, Daniel 
Sandler, and Arthur Cockfield, eds., Materials on Canadian Income Tax, 14th ed. (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2010), chapter 10; and Peter W. Hogg, Joanne E. Magee, and Jinyan Li, Principles of 
Canadian Income Tax, 7th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2010), chapter 20.
 4 For example, Tim Edgar, “Building a Better GAAR” (2008) 27:4 Virginia Tax Review 833-906.
 5 For example, David Dodge, “A New and More Coherent Approach to Tax Avoidance” (1988) 
36:1 Canadian Tax Journal 1-22; Brian J. Arnold and James R. Wilson, “The General Anti-
Avoidance Rule—Part 1” (1988) 36:4 Canadian Tax Journal 829-87 and “. . . Part 2” (1988) 36:5 
Canadian Tax Journal 1123-85; and John R. Owen, “Statutory Interpretation and the General 
Anti-Avoidance Rule: A Practitioner’s Perspective” (1998) 46:2 Canadian Tax Journal 233-73.
 6 An update on GAAR is a regular feature of conferences organized by the Canadian Tax 
Foundation. See, for example, Daryl P. Boychuk and Edward C. Rowe, “The General 
Anti-Avoidance Rule: Recent Developments and Some Practical Advice on Dealing with 
GAAR,” in 1997 Prairie Provinces Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1997), 
6:1-34; Sheldon Silver and Glenn Ernst, “Recent Cases on GAAR,” in 2001 Ontario Tax 
Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2001), 1B:1-35; Beatty F. Beaubier and Robert 
J.C. Stack, “The General Anti-Avoidance Rule: Recent Developments,” in 2001 Prairie 
Provinces Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2001), 4:1-50; Warren J.A. 
Mitchell, “GAAR: A Snapshot,” in Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Tax Conference, 2001 
Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2002), 2:1-6; Thomas M. Boddez, 
“Current Cases: GAAR, REOP, and Dispositions,” in 2002 British Columbia Tax Conference 
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2002), 5:1-31; Brian S. Nichols, “GAAR and More,” in 
2002 Ontario Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2002), 1:1-42; Patrick Boyle, 
Sharon Gulliver, Jerry Lalonde, Anne-Marie Lévesque, and Paul Lynch, “The GAAR 
Committee: Myth and Reality,” in Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-Fourth Tax Conference, 2002 
Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2003), 10:1-20; Mark Meredith, 
“GAAR in Quotes: Section 245 Cases from the Past 12 Months,” in Report of Proceedings of the 
Fifty-Fifth Tax Conference, 2003 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2004), 
2:1-23; Ken S. Skingle, “The GAAR—Be Careful Out There!” in 2004 Prairie Provinces Tax 
Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2004), 3:1-38; Brian Arnold, Judith Freedman, 
Al Meghji, Mark Meredith, and the Honourable Marshall Rothstein, “The Future of GAAR,” 
in Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Tax Conference, 2005 Conference Report (Toronto: 
Canadian Tax Foundation, 2006), 4:1-16; Jasmine Sidhu, “The Post-Supreme Court World of 
GAAR—Where Are We?” in 2006 British Columbia Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax 
Foundation, 2006), 16:1-31; Joel Nitikman, “A Year’s Worth of GAAR Cases,” in 2008 British 
Columbia Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2008), 7:1-23; Ed Kroft and 
Deen Olsen, “GAAR: Recent Developments,” in Report of Proceedings of the Sixtieth Tax 
Conference, 2008 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2009), 1:1-24; the 
Honourable Donald G.H. Bowman, Deen Olsen, Wayne Adams, Al Meghji, and Wilfrid 
Lefebvre, “GAAR: Its Evolution and Application,” in Report of Proceedings of the Sixty-First Tax 
Conference, 2009 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2010), 2:1-23; 
Douglas J. Powrie, “GAAR: A Planner’s Perspective,” in Report of Proceedings of the Sixty-Second 
Tax Conference, 2010 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2011), 8:1-32; 
and Marco Darmo and Olivier Fournier, “Recent Developments Regarding the Application of 
Subsection 245(4),” in Report of Proceedings of the Sixty-Third Tax Conference, 2011 Conference 
Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2012), 37:1-33.
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Trustco.7 This literature provides inspiration and a rich context for the design of our 
research project.
We turn to the literature on empirical legal studies8 for inspiration on research 
methodology and design. Empirical legal studies are now firmly entrenched as a 
distinct field of law.9 Through quantitative research, empirical legal studies aim at 
generating “scholarship that helps inform litigants, policymakers, and society as a 
whole about how the legal system works.”10 They seek to explain rather than justify 
decisions made by judges. Explanatory factors examined in empirical analysis of ju-
dicial decision making include ideology, race, ethnicity, gender, and societal context. 
To date, most of the studies have focused on judicial decision making in the United 
States. The inherent judicial uncertainty in GAAR makes the GAAR jurisprudence an 
ideal subject for research.
GAAR as a Game Changer
GAAR was introduced as Parliament’s response to the 1984 decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Stubart.11 This historical context clearly indicates that GAAR was 
intended to effect changes in the Canadian tax culture, ranging from the judicial 
approach to statutory interpretation to the acceptance of a degree of uncertainty in 
the applicability of tax provisions.12
 7 See, for example, Brian J. Arnold, “Policy Forum: Confusion Worse Confounded—The Supreme 
Court’s GAAR Decisions” (2006) 54:1 Canadian Tax Journal 167-209; Brian Kearl and Bruce 
Lemons, “GAAR in the Tax Court After Canada Trustco: A Practitioner’s Guide” (2007) 55:4 
Canadian Tax Journal 745-76; Duff and Erlichman, supra note 3; and Manon Thivierge, “GAAR 
Redux: After Canada Trustco,” in Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth Tax Conference, 2006 
Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2007), 4:1-23.
 8 For an overview, see Michael Heise, “The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism” [2002] no. 4 University of 
Illinois Law Review 819-50.
 9 The recent focus in legal research on empirical studies is by no means new, in the sense of 
having no precedent; similar work was attempted before 1940, as evidenced in the use of judicial 
statistics and the interest of judges in past scholarship. See Herbert M. Kritzer, “Empirical Legal 
Studies Before 1940: A Bibliographic Essay” (2009) 6:4 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 925-68. 
Still, 2004 was arguably the landmark year (to date) with respect to such studies, not only in the 
United States but also in general for the field, since it was in that year that the Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies was launched. This is the flagship journal for the Society of Empirical 
Legal Studies (see www.lawschool.cornell.edu/sels/), which held its inaugural conference in 
2006 (see www.utexas.edu/law/conferences/cels2006/). (The journal is available online at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1740-1461/issues.) As the beachhead of 
empirical legal studies, the journal and the conference have led to the growth of such a mode 
of inquiry, of which judicial decision making is a prominent theme, as it was in earlier studies.
 10 Theodore Eisenberg, “Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?” (2004) 41:4 San Diego Law 
Review 1741-46, at 1741.
 11 Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] 1 SCR 536.
 12 See Dodge, supra note 5; Arnold and Wilson, ibid.; the explanatory notes accompanying the 
original draft GAAR legislation (Canada, Department of Finance, Explanatory Notes Relating to 
Income Tax (Ottawa: Department of Finance, June 1988)); and Innes et al., supra note 3, at 7-62.
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The Stubart case involved the use of a series of transactions to shift losses from 
one company to another in technical compliance with the wording of the provisions 
of the Act (as they then read), even though the Act explicitly treated each company 
as a separate entity and the transactions in issue served no business purpose other 
than tax avoidance through loss utilization. The Supreme Court rejected the adop-
tion of a business purpose test as a judicial anti-avoidance doctrine. At the same time, 
the court held that the modern rule of statutory interpretation applied to taxing 
statutes just as it did to other statutes; that is, “[t]he words of an Act are to be read in 
their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with 
the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”13 The 
court’s decision in Stubart is consistent with the common-law principle that taxpay-
ers are entitled to arrange their affairs in order to minimize their tax liability—a 
principle recognized since the 1935 decision in the English Duke of Westminster 
case.14 This principle has been the cornerstone for tax planning. A corollary of the 
Duke of Westminster principle is that taxing statutes are to be interpreted literally, 
and are to be applied to a taxpayer’s transactions in accordance with the legal form 
of those transactions as opposed to their substance.15 The modern rule modifies this 
principle in respect of the construction of statutory provisions, but not the con-
struction of facts. In the absence of a business purpose requirement, this approach 
to statutory interpretation did little to discourage aggressive tax planning.16
GAAR was enacted to give the government and the courts a statutory basis for 
combatting abusive tax avoidance. As remarked by Bowman CJ (as he then was),
I think that GAAR stems from two factors. First, it stems from the fact that people who 
draft legislation have finally thrown up their hands and said that no matter how spe-
cific we get, we cannot plug every loophole, so we need this sort of general rule to fill 
in the gaps. Second, the attitude of the courts—Stubart being an example—is that we 
are going back to strict construction, and the Duke of Westminster is alive and well. 
Therefore, the government figures that many schemes will succeed unless we have 
some sort of general anti-avoidance rule.17
 13 Stubart, supra note 11, at 578, quoting Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at 87.
 14 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Westminster (Duke), [1936] AC 1 (HL).
 15 Hogg et al., supra note 3, at 611.
 16 Brian J. Arnold, “The Canadian General Anti-Avoidance Rule,” in Graeme S. Cooper, ed., Tax 
Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 1997), 221-45, at 224. Following 
Stubart, tax planning became increasingly aggressive; many transactions involved the utilization 
of losses, resulting in a serious shortfall in corporate income tax between 1985 and 1987.
 17 The Honourable Donald G.H. Bowman with Al Meghji and J. Scott Wilkie, “A Fireside Chat 
with the Chief Justice of the Tax Court of Canada” (2010) 58, special supp. Canadian Tax 
Journal 29-40, at 35.
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GAAR was meant to be a game changer in terms of how courts approach tax-
avoidance cases.18 As Rothstein J observed in Copthorne, “if the Court is confined to a 
consideration of the language of the provisions in question, without regard to their 
underlying rationale, it would seem inevitable that the GAAR would be rendered 
meaningless.”19 A court involved in a GAAR analysis has the “unusual duty” of going 
behind the words of the legislation to determine the object, spirit, or purpose of the 
provision or provisions relied on by the taxpayer.20
To what extent have the courts moved away from the Duke of Westminster prin-
ciple? This is still an open question.21 Our research was designed to answer this 
question by looking at how often the courts refer to the legislative context and pur-
pose in interpreting the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, our hypothesis is that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Canada Trustco is a game changer in terms of GAAR an-
alysis. Our research tracks GAAR cases decided by the Tax Court of Canada before and 
after that decision in order to establish whether there is a “Canada Trustco effect.”
A fascinating dimension of the game-changer question is whether GAAR has led 
to any changes in how the courts deal with legislative gaps. In non-GAAR cases, 
legislative ambiguity is often interpreted in favour of the taxpayer. The literature 
and jurisprudence suggest that the extent of change is unclear. Many judges do not 
interpret GAAR in such a way as to fill in legislative gaps.22 For example, Bowman ACJ 
(as he then was) wrote in Geransky:
The Income Tax Act is a statute that is remarkable for its specificity and replete with 
anti-avoidance provisions designed to counteract specific perceived abuses. Where a 
taxpayer applies those provisions and manages to avoid the pitfalls the Minister cannot 
say: “Because you have avoided the shoals and traps of the Act and have not carried out 
your commercial transaction in a manner that maximizes your tax, I will use GAAR to 
fill in any gaps not covered by the multitude of specific anti-avoidance provisions.”
That is not what GAAR is all about.23
 18 As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 13, “[t]o 
the extent that the GAAR constitutes a ‘provision to the contrary’ as discussed in Shell (at 
para. 45), the Duke of Westminster principle and the emphasis on textual interpretation may be 
attenuated.” The court reiterated this point in Lipson v. Canada, 2009 SCC 1, at paragraph 54, 
and Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, 2011 SCC 63, at paragraph 70.
 19 Copthorne, supra note 18, at paragraph 111.
 20 Ibid., at paragraph 66.
 21 Bowman J remarked in Continental Bank of Canada et al. v. The Queen, 94 DTC 1858, at 1872 
(TCC), “What, then, is the ‘object and spirit’ of subsection 97(2)? I am not sure what its spirit, 
if any, is—spirits tend to be somewhat illusive [sic]—but its object seems rather straightforward.”
 22 In Landrus v. The Queen, 2008 TCC 274; aff ’d. 2009 FCA 113, the court held that it is 
inappropriate to use GAAR to fill in gaps left by Parliament. Essentially, if there are specific 
anti-avoidance rules and the taxpayer has successfully navigated them, then the Canada 
Revenue Agency (CRA) should not have the power to undo the plan by applying GAAR.
 23 Geransky v. The Queen, 2001 DTC 243, at paragraphs 42-43 (TCC).
gaar in action: an empirical exploration of tax court cases  n  329
In Lehigh Cement, the Federal Court of Appeal stated that even if a taxpayer re-
lies on a provision in an unforeseen or novel manner, this will not necessarily mean 
that there has been a misuse of the provision: “[T]he Crown cannot discharge the 
burden of establishing that a transaction results in a misuse of [an exemption] 
merely by asserting that the transaction exploits a previously unnoticed legislative 
gap.”24 On the other hand, in the Tax Court decision in Antle, Miller J remarked 
that “[l]oopholes are not policy-makers.”25 Whether taking advantage of a loophole 
is abusive or acceptable depends on whether “there has been a frustration of the 
object, spirit and purpose of the provisions in play.”26 Because of the small number 
of cases involving this issue, our research does not capture this dimension of the 
game-changer question.
Inherent Uncertainty of GAAR
Section 245 is clearly “a different kettle of fish” compared to the other provisions 
of the Act, in terms of both its drafting style and its intended function.27 As a 
“standard-based” provision, it is extraordinary because the Act is predominantly 
a “rule-based” statute. Other provisions of the statute tend to be technically com-
plex, precisely worded, and drafted in an airtight manner to prevent loopholes. 
GAAR is drafted in broader, more open-ended language, incorporating undefined 
concepts such as “misuse” and “abuse.”28
Earlier literature on GAAR discusses its inherent uncertainty, the issue of its con-
stitutionality,29 a preference for the words of the statute over unexpressed notions 
of policy (which was thought to be part of the abuse analysis),30 and concerns about 
the subjectivity of GAAR.31 As one practitioner recalled,
[w]hen GAAR was first brought in, when you looked at the text about whether something 
was a misuse or abuse, as a lawyer you couldn’t help but think that this open-ended 
 24 Lehigh Cement Limited v. Canada, 2010 FCA 124, at paragraph 37.
 25 Antle v. The Queen, 2009 TCC 465, at paragraph 102.
 26 Ibid.
 27 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen, 2003 TCC 215, at paragraph 91. 
 28 Miller J remarked in Canada Trustco, ibid., “The success or failure of the application of GAAR 
left to the Court’s finding of a clear and unambiguous policy inevitably invites uncertainty. That 
is simply the nature of the GAAR legislation in relying upon such terms as misuse and abuse.”
 29 For example, Joel Nitikman, “Is GAAR Void for Vagueness?” (1989) 37:6 Canadian Tax Journal 
1409-47; and Howard J. Kellough, “A Review and Analysis of the Redrafted General Anti-
Avoidance Rule” (1988) 36:1 Canadian Tax Journal 23-78, at 60-62. In The Queen v. Gregory, 
2000 DTC 6563, at paragraph 2 (FCA), the taxpayer argued, without success, that section 245 
is “not intelligible, incapable of rational application and as such, unconstitutionally vague.”
 30 See the comments by Brian Arnold in Arnold et al., supra note 6, at 4:5.
 31 Al Meghji, “Pending GAAR Litigation and Other Anti-Avoidance Issues,” in 1996 Prairie 
Provinces Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1996), 10:1-24.
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text, which invites a judge to answer the question as to whether something is a misuse 
or abuse, appeared to be an open invitation for judges to engage their own fiscal mor-
ality. The concern was whether we are really going to have this test apply as a legal 
standard, consistent from case to case, where similarly situated taxpayers are treated 
similarly. Could this standard be crafted by the courts into a legal standard rather than 
something perhaps far more subjective?32
GAAR was variously described as “the most ominous, and likely the most mysteri-
ous, weapon of the Canada Revenue Agency”;33 an “ill-considered provision” that 
will “haunt the Act for many years to come,” and whose purpose is to “act as an 
intimidating factor”;34 a “fuzzy,” “obscure,” and “opaque” provision35 “shrouded in 
uncertainty”;36 or a “beast [to be] tamed.”37
The sense of uncertainty evident in the literature reflects the prevailing judicial 
uncertainty in the early years following the introduction of GAAR. Initially, some 
Tax Court judges reacted to GAAR with caution, describing it as an “extreme sanction” 
or a “blunt instrument,”38 an “ultimate weapon,” or a “heavy hammer.”39 Others 
worried about the health of the Duke of Westminster principle, and sought to limit 
the use of GAAR.40 Other judges wondered what the real purpose of GAAR was and 
tried to give meaning to such purpose.41 In the earlier GAAR cases, Tax Court judges 
generally approached GAAR with caution and embarked on a process of “reading 
 32 Al Meghji, in Bowman et al., supra note 6, at 2:14.
 33 Skingle, supra note 6, at 3:1.
 34 Howard J. Kellough, “The GAAR—Are There Circumstances When It Will Not Have 
Application?” in 1994 British Columbia Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 
1994), 5A:1-20, at 5A:17.
 35 Marshall Rothstein, in Arnold et al., supra note 6, at 4:4.
 36 Nichols, supra note 6, at 1:1.
 37 Grace Chow, “GAAR—The Beast Finally Tamed” (2006) 6:2 Tax Perspectives 5-7 
(www.taxspecialistgroup.ca/public/taxPerspectives.asp?art=84&site=tsg).
 38 Bowman J in Jabs Construction Limited v. The Queen, 99 DTC 729, at paragraph 48 (TCC); and 
CIT Financial Ltd. v. The Queen, 2003 TCC 544, at paragraph 30.
 39 Miller J in Hill v. The Queen, 2002 DTC 1749, at paragraph 63 (TCC); and Canada Trustco, 
supra note 27, at paragraph 58. 
 40 See, for example, Lipson, supra note 18, at paragraph 54, per Binnie J (Deschamps J concurring): 
“How healthy is the Duke of Westminster? There is cause for concern.” According to Binnie J, 
“[t]he GAAR is a weapon that, unless contained by the jurisprudence, could have a widespread, 
serious and unpredictable effect on legitimate tax planning” (ibid., at paragraph 55). Many 
judges expressed similar views, regarding GAAR with a large degree of suspicion and seeing 
their role with respect to GAAR as fundamentally one of limiting its application. For further 
discussion, see Brian J. Arnold, “The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule” (2004) 52:2 Canadian Tax Journal 488-511.
 41 For example, in McNichol et al. v. The Queen, 97 DTC 111, at 120 (TCC), Bonner J wrote, “The 
telos [object and purpose] of section 245 is the thwarting of abusive tax avoidance transactions.”
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down” the provision.42 The Federal Court of Appeal, in its first GAAR decision (OSFC 
Holdings), imposed a “clear and unambiguous policy” test for finding abuse.43 The 
general sense of uncertainty and confusion continued until 2005, when the Supreme 
Court of Canada provided some long-awaited guidance in the Canada Trustco44 and 
Mathew45 decisions.
Canada Trustco is a landmark decision in many respects.46 The tax bar expressed 
a collective sigh of relief. “[T]he result in Canada Trustco was essentially what the tax 
community had expected it would be.”47 However, while the decision did provide 
some clarity with respect to the interpretive framework and the relationship be-
tween GAAR and the Duke of Westminster principle, much uncertainty remains. The 
Supreme Court allows judges of the Tax Court a great degree of latitude in GAAR 
cases,48 and it has clearly expressed its reluctance to hear appeals of future GAAR 
decisions.49 Applying the interpretation guidelines and principles pronounced in 
Canada Trustco does not guarantee consistency in the application of GAAR. In Canada 
Trustco, the court confirmed that the line between legitimate tax minimization and 
abusive tax avoidance is “far from bright.”50 In fact, it is difficult to reconcile the 
decision in Mathew with that in Canada Trustco on any principled basis.51 For ex-
ample, in Canada Trustco the court applied a largely textual interpretation and did 
not give much consideration to the context for the capital cost allowance provision 
relied on by the taxpayer in obtaining the tax benefit, whereas in Mathew the court 
adopted a contextual and purposive interpretation of the provision relied on in that 
case. Also, reliance on the economic substance of the transactions was rejected in 
Canada Trustco52 but not in Mathew, where the court stated that “[t]he abusive nature 
 42 See Mitchell, supra note 6.
 43 OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, 2001 FCA 260, at paragraph 69.
 44 Canada Trustco, supra note 2.
 45 Mathew v. Canada, 2005 SCC 55 (sometimes cited sub nom. Kaulius v. The Queen, 2005 DTC 
5538 (SCC)).
 46 For further discussion of the case, see Arnold, supra note 7; Innes et al., supra note 3; and Duff 
and Erlichman, supra note 3.
 47 Innes et al., supra note 3, at 77.
 48 The Supreme Court emphasized that other than the textual, contextual, and purposive 
interpretation of the provisions of the Act, it is a question of fact whether a transaction is an 
avoidance transaction and, if so, whether it frustrates the purpose of the provisions of the Act. 
Accordingly, the trial judge’s decision is not to be interfered with save for “palpable and 
overriding error”: Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 46.
 49 Ibid.
 50 Ibid., at paragraph 16. See David G. Duff, “Lipson v Canada—Whither the Canadian GAAR?” 
[2009] no. 2 British Tax Review 161-69; and Vern Krishna, “GAAR Versus the Westminster 
Principle: Which Trumps?” (2008) 28:1 Lawyers Weekly.
 51 See generally Arnold, supra note 7, and in particular the discussion at 197-205.
 52 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraphs 75-76.
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of the transactions is confirmed by the vacuity and artificiality of the non-arm’s 
length aspect of the initial relationship between Partnership A and STC.”53
The literature has pointed to numerous inconsistencies in GAAR decisions ren-
dered by the Tax Court since Canada Trustco.54 These include
n the treatment of surplus stripping in Evans55 (GAAR was not applied) and 
Desmarais56 (GAAR was applied);
n spousal rollovers and the borrowing of funds in Overs57 (GAAR was not applied) 
and Lipson58 (GAAR was applied);
n the preservation of paid-up capital in Collins & Aikman59 (GAAR was not applied) 
and Copthorne60 (GAAR was applied); and
n interprovincial tax arbitrage transactions in Canada Safeway61 and Husky Energy62 
(GAAR was not applied) and OGT Holdings63 (GAAR was applied).
The sense of uncertainty was not eased by the Supreme Court’s three-way split 
decision in Lipson.64 The majority decision can be reconciled with Mathew in that in 
both cases the taxpayer relied on a specific anti-avoidance rule to achieve tax avoid-
ance; that is, in the words of Bowman CJ at the Tax Court in Lipson, anti-avoidance 
provisions were “turned on their heads.”65 Unfortunately, the majority’s process for 
finding the object, spirit, and purpose of the attribution rules in Lipson is less than 
clear. The minority decision by Binnie J largely renders GAAR ineffective and cannot 
be reconciled with Mathew. Rothstein J also dissented, on a rather technical ground.
Subsequent to Lipson, and in contrast to that decision, the Supreme Court’s 
unanimous decision in Copthorne66 reinforces and consolidates principles enunciated 
 53 Mathew, supra note 45, at paragraph 62.
 54 For comments, see Sidhu, supra note 6; Kearl and Lemons, supra note 7; and Thivierge, supra 
note 7.
 55 Evans v. The Queen, 2005 TCC 684.
 56 Desmarais v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 44.
 57 Overs v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 26.
 58 Lipson v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 148.
 59 Collins & Aikman Products Co. v. The Queen, 2009 TCC 299.
 60 Copthorne Holdings Ltd v. The Queen, 2007 TCC 481.
 61 Canada Safeway Limited v. Alberta, 2012 ABCA 232; aff ’g. 2011 ABQB 329.
 62 Husky Energy Inc. v. Alberta, 2012 ABCA 231; aff ’g. 2011 ABQB 268.
 63 OGT Holdings Ltd. c. Québec (Sous-ministre du Revenu), 2009 QCCA 191. For comment, see 
Sidhu, supra note 6, at 16:31.
 64 Lipson, supra note 18.
 65 Lipson, supra note 58, at paragraph 32.
 66 Copthorne, supra note 18.
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in earlier cases,67 while providing additional guidance on the meaning of “series,” 
and on the methodology for determining the object, spirit, and purpose of statutory 
provisions and for finding abuse. More recently, the Supreme Court had an opportun-
ity to opine on the relationship between GAAR and treaty shopping in Garron Family 
Trust,68 but it declined to do so on the basis that such comment would be obiter.
After more than two decades of experience with the application of GAAR, there 
seems to be an emerging recognition in the literature that the initial pessimistic 
view about the provision may not be justified, given that the courts have provided 
some guiding principles.69 One commentator has remarked that GAAR is capable of 
performing the role of a safety valve that “relieves the pressure arising from the 
conflict between the government’s need for certainty of revenue and a system that 
requires clear rules and predictability.”70 While the worry about uncertainty continues 
after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Canada Trustco and Mathew,71 some commen-
tators have been pleasantly surprised by the level of success enjoyed by taxpayers in 
subsequent GAAR cases.72 It is not clear whether that level of success will be sustain-
able, since the Supreme Court in Copthorne “appears to have moved its goalposts in 
the Crown’s favour.”73
Drawing on the existing literature, our research investigates the degree of incon-
sistency in case outcomes and any discernible trends or patterns that may provide 
some sense of certainty with respect to the future application of GAAR.
Judicial Smell Test
The judicial uncertainty in GAAR cases makes one wonder if the application of GAAR 
involves a smell test74 and if a judge’s “fiscal morality” matters.75 Donald Bowman, 
 67 In Copthorne, ibid., at paragraph 57, the Supreme Court made it very clear that Canada Trustco 
is a recent decision and there must be “substantial reasons to believe the precedent was wrongly 
decided” in order for it to be revisited. To the extent that any points about the interpretation of 
GAAR issues are not addressed in Copthorne, one should presume that any applicable comments 
by the court in Canada Trustco and Mathew, and in the majority decision in Lipson, will govern.
 68 Garron Family Trust v. The Queen, 2009 TCC 450; aff ’d. 2010 FCA 309 (sub nom. St. Michael 
Trust Corp. v. Canada); aff ’d. 2012 SCC 14 (sub nom. Fundy Settlement v. Canada).
 69 See, for example, Meghji’s comments in Bowman et al., supra note 6, at 2:14. Meghji also 
thought that the courts have done a far better job than one could have ever imagined.
 70 Powrie, supra note 6, at 8:2.
 71 Jack Bernstein, Barbara Worndl, and Kay Leung, “Canadian Supreme Court’s Pronouncement 
on GAAR: A Return to Uncertainty” (2005) 40:5 Tax Notes International 437-47.
 72 Kearl and Lemons, supra note 7.
 73 Darmo and Fournier, supra note 6, at 37:26.
 74 At a tax conference prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lipson, Deen Olsen raised this open 
question: see Kroft and Olsen, supra note 6, at 1:9. It was argued that some of the post-Canada 
Trustco cases, such as OGT Holdings Ltd. (supra note 63), were decided using the smell test: see 
Nitikman, supra note 6, at 7:1.
 75 Meghji, in Bowman et al., supra note 6, at 2:14. 
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who is known as one of the best tax judges in Canada76 and (until his retirement in 
2008) decided most of the Tax Court’s GAAR cases, acknowledges the existence of 
the smell test:
The first thing that is absolutely certain, in my view, is that whether you win or lose a 
GAAR case depends on the judge you get in the first instance. . . . I think that there 
continues to be a certain visceral element—people inelegantly call it the smell test, the 
olfactory factor, the gut reaction.77
The literature provides anecdotal evidence supporting the existence of judicial 
smell tests. As mentioned earlier, seemingly similar transactions are treated differ-
ently under GAAR. The divergent approaches taken by the same judge in different 
cases cannot be easily reconciled. For example, when asked how he can possibly 
reconcile his decision in Lipson with his decision in Evans, Bowman confesses, “Well, 
just one got past my nose in a slightly different way than the other one.”78 It is also 
not hard to imagine a different outcome in some cases if the case had been decided 
by a different judge. At the Tax Court, for example, Bell J did not apply GAAR in any 
of the cases that he heard. What might have been the outcome in Univar79 or MIL 
Investments80 (both decided by Bell J) if they had been decided by Bowie J, who ap-
plied GAAR in both of his cases? At the Supreme Court, if Abella and LeBel JJ had 
been replaced by Iacobucci and Major JJ on the bench in Lipson, how would that 
case have been decided?
Is the smell test an unruly sort of test? Bowman has acknowledged that
sometimes the reasons for a decision might not reflect the full step-by-step thinking 
leading to an outcome. But judges have a sense that is informed by their experience 
with the law, within the framework that counsel set out to argue a case, and just be-
cause the reasons for a decision might appear results-based doesn’t mean that they are. 
By the same token, human nature plays a role in everything, and inevitably there will 
be cases that provoke one or another kind of initial reaction—though good judges get 
beyond that in their application of the law, with the benefit of their experience.81
In Copthorne, the Supreme Court warned against the use of a smell test: “[D]eter-
mining the rationale of the relevant provisions of the Act should not be conflated 
 76 See the special supplement to the Canadian Tax Journal published in 2010 by the Canadian Tax 
Foundation to mark the retirement of Donald Bowman as chief justice of the Tax Court of 
Canada, cited above at note 17.
 77 Bowman, in Bowman et al., supra note 6, at 2:16.
 78 Ibid., at 2:17.
 79 Univar Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, 2005 TCC 723.
 80 MIL (Investments) SA v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 460.
 81 Bowman et al., supra note 17, at 34.
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with a value judgment of what is right or wrong nor with theories about what tax 
law ought to be or ought to do.”82 Arguably, the approach articulated by the court 
does not amount to a smell test because it is anchored in the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions to determine their purpose.
As an empirical question, though, how can the existence of a judicial smell test 
be confirmed? One possible approach is to look for traces of it in the judicial deci-
sion making in specific cases. Our research links the attributes of Tax Court judges 
to the outcomes in their GAAR decisions. If who the judge is affects how the case is 
decided, the finding could lend credence to the existence of a judicial smell test.
Factors Influencing Judicial Decision Making
The literature on empirical legal studies identifies certain factors that help to ex-
plain rather than justify judicial decision making. As noted above, these explanatory 
factors include ideology, race, ethnicity, gender, and societal context. At present, 
most of the studies are on judicial decision making in general and are limited to the 
United States. However, there is an emerging body of work on the topic in Canada, 
and there are some studies in the tax area.
Judicial Decision Making in General
Ideology has been found to influence judicial decision making by some US judges; 
specifically, ideological preferences have been detected in the published opinions of 
US appellate court judges, but not in those of US district court judges.83 The influ-
ences are more notable when the complexity of the cases increases: conservative 
judges are found to be more likely to make ideologically consistent decisions in 
complex cases than are liberal judges.84 Strategic analysis of US judicial behaviour 
has revealed that in order to avoid reversal of their decisions by higher courts, 
judges seem to dampen expression of their ideological leanings. In addition, to create 
enduring law and policy, judges appear to take into account the views of other rel-
evant actors, such as the legislative branch, in order to minimize the risk that their 
decisions may be overturned by subsequent legislation.85 It has been suggested that, 
 82 Copthorne, supra note 18, at paragraph 70.
 83 Denise M. Keele, Robert W. Malmsheimer, Donald W. Floyd, and Lianjun Zhang, “An Analysis 
of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions” (2009) 6:1 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 213-39.
 84 Laura P. Moyer, “The Role of Case Complexity in Judicial Decision-Making” (2012) 34:3 Law 
& Policy 291-312.
 85 Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi, “The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions” (2010) 6:1 Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 341-58; and Tonja Jacobi and Matthew Sag, “Taking the 
Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases” (2009) 98:1 Georgetown 
Law Journal 1-75.
336  n  canadian tax journal / revue fiscale canadienne (2013) 61:2
in addition to the ideology of judges, the ideological character of the cases being 
decided should be factored into empirical legal studies.86
Another area related to ideology in judicial decision making is the judicial ap-
pointment process. In the US judicial nomination process, ideological divergence 
between the voting senator and the nominee coupled with questionable qualifica-
tions of the nominee would likely lead the senator to vote against the nominee, 
while ideological convergence and exemplary qualifications would likely lead the 
senator to vote for the nominee.87
Researchers have also considered the role of race, ethnicity, and gender, factors 
that have been found to affect judicial decision making not only in the United States 
but elsewhere.88 With respect to gender, inspired by the controversy over comments 
by a female US judge suggesting that female judges outperform their male counter-
parts, one study tested whether in the United States female judges who have weaker 
credentials and less experience underperform by comparison with male judges.89 
The study found that despite differences in background, female judges perform at 
least as well as their male counterparts.
As members of society, judges are bound to be affected by the societal context. A 
number of studies have found that the preappointment careers of judges, such as 
practising or teaching law, may influence their judicial decision making.90 One study 
found broad support for the proposition that in an economic downturn, US judges 
tend to be less likely to vote for the government as a way to punish the government 
for the economic decline.91 Another study found that when their country is at war, 
judges tend to be more conservative and more intolerant of criminal deviance than 
 86 Carolyn Shapiro, “The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal Scholarship” 
(2010) 75:1 Missouri Law Review 79-142. As Shapiro notes, because the ideological character of 
cases is likely to be rooted in the legal issues of the case, a judicial decision-making database 
that includes information on legal issues would be a useful step forward. See also Carolyn 
Shapiro, “Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court” 
(2008) 60:3 Hastings Law Journal 477-540.
 87 Charles R. Shipan, “Partisanship, Ideology, and Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees” 
(2008) 5:1 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 55-76.
 88 Oren Gazal-Ayal and Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, “Let My People Go: Ethnic In-Group Bias in 
Judicial Decisions—Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment” (2010) 7:3 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 403-28.
 89 Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman, and Eric A. Posner, “Judging Women” (2011) 
8:3 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 504-32. As readers may recall, the judge who originally 
made the controversial comments, Sonia Sotomayor, was subsequently appointed as a justice of 
the US Supreme Court, though she had to answer to accusations of gender bias in the course 
of her nomination process.
 90 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Andrew D. Martin, “The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and 
Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court” (2003) 91:4 California Law 
Review 903-65.
 91 Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein, and Nancy Staudt, “Economic Trends and Judicial Outcomes: 
A Macrotheory of the Court” (2009) 58:7 Duke Law Journal 1191-1230.
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in peacetime.92 It has also been suggested that the public mood on issues relevant to 
specific cases at the time those cases are heard has some influence on the decisions of 
judges at the US Supreme Court.93 Public sentiment affects not only how cases are 
decided but also how those decisions are perceived: citizens are more likely to accept 
judicial decisions as legitimate when they agree with the reasons for those decisions.94
The incorporation of the societal environment in the analysis of judicial decision 
making is relatively new, but it is not the only analytical advancement in the past 
decade. New approaches have been field-tested, including the following:
n	 the use of an automated learning approach to classify the text of legal briefs in 
the search for the deeper meaning of the language used in those documents;95
n	 the use of classification trees to map case facts to case outcomes, in order to 
enhance understanding of the application of legal rules in judicial decision 
making;96 and
n	 the further development of analysis of random assignment of cases to judges 
in evaluating the influence of partisanship in judicial decision making.97
In Canada, both the governing political party at the time of appointment and the 
gender of Ontario appellate court judges have been found to be explanatory variables 
in judicial decision making.98 However, the political party at the time of appointment 
may not be a reliable predictor of voting outcomes for Supreme Court of Canada 
judges, since the policy preferences of the prime minister of the day and those of 
individual judges have been found not to be strongly associated; in particular, the 
policy preferences of judges seemingly changed over time.99 In Supreme Court of Can-
ada cases concerning government regulation of the economy and private economic 
 92 Tom S. Clark, “Judicial Decision Making During Wartime” (2006) 3:3 Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies 397-419.
 93 Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin, “Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? 
Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why)” (2010) 13:2 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law 263-81.
 94 Dan Simon and Nicholas Scurich, “Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision Making” (2011) 8:4 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 709-27.
 95 Michael Evans, Wayne McIntosh, Jimmy Lin, and Cynthia Cates, “Recounting the Courts? 
Applying Automated Content Analysis To Enhance Empirical Legal Research” (2007) 4:4 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 1007-39. 
 96 Jonathan P. Kastellec, “The Statistical Analysis of Judicial Decisions and Legal Rules with 
Classification Trees” (2010) 7:2 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 202-30. 
 97 Matthew Hall, “Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals” (2010) 7:3 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 574-89. 
 98 James Stribopoulos and Moin A. Yahya, “Does a Judge’s Party of Appointment or Gender 
Matter to Case Outcomes? An Empirical Study of the Court of Appeal for Ontario” (2007) 
45:2 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 315-63.
 99 Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green, “Policy Preference Change and Appointments to the 
Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1-46.
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disputes, the influence of the political party as a variable seems to interact with the 
variable of regional ties. Supreme Court of Canada judges from Quebec who were 
appointed by the Liberal Party were found to be less liberal than those appointed 
by the Conservative Party, and thus less likely to decide in favour of the government, 
because the policies of the Liberal Party in Quebec tended to be more conservative 
than those of the Conservative Party; however, the reverse was found to be the case 
for judges with ties to other regions of Canada.100
Judicial Decision Making in Tax Cases
Empirical legal studies of judicial decision making in tax cases remain the next fron-
tier in both the United States and Canada, even as the body of knowledge has been 
taking shape. One study has found that the ideology of US Supreme Court judges is 
an ineffective predictor of voting outcomes in tax cases;101 however, another study 
suggests that when the US Supreme Court has a majority of Republican judges, it 
is more likely to rule in favour of the government.102 The ideology of US judges 
was found to affect the outcomes in corporate tax cases, but not in cases involving 
individual taxpayers.103 In corporate tax cases, liberal judges are more likely than 
conservative judges to find for the government.
In the United States, one study has found gender and race to be influential in ex-
plaining judicial decision making, with female trial court judges and black appellate 
court judges tending to decide for taxpayers.104 Increases in government spending, 
such as defence or war efforts, have been found to lead to an expected increase in 
government wins; also, in times of war and foreign policy crises, there is a notable 
increase in the government’s chances of winning.105 When the government is the 
petitioner for review at the US Supreme Court, the likelihood of a pro-government 
outcome increases.106 When the economy is booming, the government is less likely 
 100 Donald R. Songer and Susan W. Johnson, “Judicial Decision Making in the Supreme Court of 
Canada: Updating the Personal Attribute Model” (2007) 40:4 Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 911-34.
 101 Charles M. Cameron and Jee-Kwang Park, “How Will They Vote? Predicting the Future 
Behavior of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937-2006” (2009) 6:3 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 
485-511. Scalia J was known for favouring the plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation. 
His participation in tax abuse cases was found to have an effect on the government’s win rate, 
but the results did not achieve statistical significance. See Joshua D. Blank and Nancy Staudt, 
“Corporate Shams” (2012) 87:6 New York University Law Review 1641-1712, at 1677.
 102 Blank and Staudt, supra note 101, at 1674.
 103 Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, and Peter Wiedenbeck, “The Ideological Component of Judging 
in the Taxation Context” (2006) 84:7 Washington University Law Review 1797-1821.
 104 Daniel M. Schneider, “Using the Social Background Model To Explain Who Wins Federal 
Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?” (2005) 25:1 Virginia 
Tax Review 201-49.
 105 Blank and Staudt, supra note 101, at 1674.
 106 Ibid.
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to win.107 In US tax cases, the use of judicial tax doctrines and the case outcomes 
were found to be associated, with taxpayers obtaining favourable outcomes with the 
use of the business purpose and sham transaction doctrines and the government 
obtaining favourable outcomes with the use of the step transaction doctrine.108
For Canadian tax cases, the investigation of the influence of ideology, gender, and 
race is at an early stage. An exploratory study of Supreme Court decision making in 
the period 1920-2003 tested the sociodemographic characteristics of judges as ex-
planatory variables of case outcomes.109 The importance of this factor was flagged, 
but more research is needed to understand the relationships between the socio-
demographic background of judges and their judicial decision making. A recent study 
of appeals of tax assessments to the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of 
Appeal found that “policy preferences of judges matter, but not that much.”110
Value and Limitations of Empirical Legal Studies
Despite the increase in the number of empirical legal studies papers published in 
the past decade, opinion as to whether such studies can provide a legitimate analysis 
of the evolution of the law remains inconclusive, owing to inherent constraints in 
statistical analysis and the limited data available.111 Empirical legal studies face un-
certainty as a recognized discipline within the field of law.112 Major challenges arise 
 107 Ibid., at 1674-75.
 108 Daniel M. Schneider, “Use of Judicial Doctrines in Federal Tax Cases Decided by Trial Courts, 
1993-2006: A Quantitative Assessment” (2009) 57:1 Cleveland State Law Review 35-75.
 109 Thaddeus Hwong, “An Exploration of Influences of Sociodemographic Characteristics of 
Supreme Court Justices in Judicial Decision-Making in Income Tax Cases, 1920-2003” (2009) 
33:1 Manitoba Law Journal 151-96.
 110 Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green, “Policy Preferences and Expertise in Canadian Tax 
Adjudication” (University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, August 27, 2012) (http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2105785).
 111 Michael Heise, “An Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990-2009” 
[2011] no. 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1739-52. In the past decade, the debates have been 
informative, with the value of empirical legal studies in judicial decision making being both 
challenged and defended. See, for example, the Honorable Harry T. Edwards and Michael A. 
Livermore, “Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt To Understand the Factors Affecting 
Appellate Decisionmaking” (2009) 58:8 Duke Law Journal 1895-1989; and Richard A. Posner, 
“Some Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore” (2010) 59:6 Duke Law 
Journal 1177-86. Since the defence of the challenge was also challenged (Michael A. 
Livermore, “Realist Lawyers and Realistic Legalists: A Brief Rebuttal to Judge Posner” (2010) 
59:6 Duke Law Journal 1187-93), the debate will likely continue.
 112 Marin Roger Scordato, “Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in the Post-Realist 
Era” (2008) 48:2 Santa Clara Law Review 353-440. As a branch of legal inquiry, empirical legal 
studies can be cast as social science in law. Whether they will flourish front and centre, like 
social science in business, or linger along the sidelines, like social science in medicine, is 
unclear. Mark C. Suchman and Elizabeth Mertz, “Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical 
Legal Studies and New Legal Realism” (2010) 6:1 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 555-79.
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from the fact that empirical analytical expertise and data sets suitable for analysis are 
not readily available.113
On the other hand, empirical legal research is useful in raising questions that 
may not be asked in other forms of inquiry in legal scholarship.114 It also offers some 
explanation of certain “big picture” questions. The body of Canadian GAAR jurispru-
dence is a good candidate for such an empirical project because of judicial uncertainty 
in the application of section 245, the evolution of the jurisprudence, the potential 
influence of a smell test, and the importance of the jurisprudence in this area of the 
tax law.
re se A rch me tho d o lo g y
Data Sets
As described earlier, the goal of our study was to see whether patterns in GAAR cases 
and attributes of Tax Court judges could help to answer the three research questions. 
We used two data sets, one consisting of case attributes of the 37 GAAR decisions at 
the Tax Court of Canada over the period 1997-2009, and the other consisting of 
personal and societal attributes of the 19 Tax Court judges who decided those cases.
To identify the cases for the study, we searched the databases published by 
Taxnet Pro® and CCH and collected a set of cases published after 1988 and before 
the end of 2010 that included one or more references to “GAAR” or “general anti-
avoidance rule” or “section 245.” This initial search included cases decided by the 
Tax Court of Canada, the Federal Court Trial Division, the Federal Court of Ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of Canada, and provincial courts. Among the set of cases, 
17 merely referred to section 245 without providing any analysis,115 and thus were 
 113 Thaddeus Hwong, “A Review of Quantitative Studies of Decision Making in the Supreme 
Court of Canada” (2003) 30:3 Manitoba Law Journal 353-82.
 114 Whether empirical legal studies can raise important questions is a legitimate query: see Jack 
Knight, “Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?” (2009) 
58:7 Duke Law Journal 1531-56. One way to make empirical legal studies indispensable to the 
field of law is to nurture a symbiosis in division of labour—empirical legal studies can be 
helpful in asking tough questions, while other forms of legal analysis can be helpful in finding 
elusive answers. On the mixed approach, see Hwong, supra note 109. See also Gregory C. Sisk, 
“The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial 
Decision Making” (2008) 93:4 Cornell Law Review 873-900.
 115 These cases include Adams et al. v. The Queen, 96 DTC 1145 (TCC); Aventis Pharma Inc. v. The 
Queen, 2007 TCC 629; Blackburn Radio Inc. v. The Queen, 2009 TCC 155; DeGeer v. The Queen, 
2000 DTC 1749 (TCC); Fording Coal Limited v. The Queen, 95 DTC 571 (TCC); Gestion B. 
Dufresne Ltée v. The Queen, 98 DTC 2078 (TCC); Gregory v. The Queen, 2000 DTC 2027 
(TCC); Gregory et al. v. The Queen, 2001 DTC 163 (TCC); Harris v. The Queen, 99 DTC 5018 
(FCTD); Interior Savings Credit Union v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 411; Kossow v. The Queen, 2006 
TCC 151; Large v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 509; Makuz v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 263; Sherle v. 
The Queen, 2009 TCC 377; Silicate Holdings Limited v. The Queen, 2001 DTC 299 (TCC); 
Standard Mortgage Investment Corporation et al. v. The Queen, 2000 DTC 1451 (TCC); and 
Webster et al. v. The Queen, 2001 DTC 738 (TCC).
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excluded from our data set. We also excluded from the final data set decisions on the 
goods and services tax, such as Michelin Tires116 and Ventes D’Auto Giordano,117 and 
decisions of provincial courts,118 the Federal Court, and the Supreme Court of 
Canada (these being too few to allow any meaningful comparison). We decided to 
analyze the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada cases on 
their own instead of including them in the data set.
Since 2010, there have been at least seven more Tax Court decisions involving 
GAAR.119 We considered adding these to our data set but decided not to do so because, 
on reviewing the decisions, we concluded that they would not alter our findings. 
Accordingly, we capture these cases through discussion of the answers to our re-
search questions, rather than through statistical analysis.
The final case data set, shown in table 1, contains 37 cases decided at the Tax 
Court of Canada by a total of 19 judges120 in the period 1997-2009. (The Tax Court 
of Canada did not rule on any GAAR case in 2010.) In this and subsequent tables 
listing cases in chronological order, the cases are divided into two groups—cases 
decided before the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Canada Trustco and 
Mathew, and cases decided after those decisions. (The line of demarcation is indi-
cated by a space.)
The data on the personal and societal attributes of the 19 Tax Court judges are 
based on publicly available sources, including biographical information on the web-
sites of the Tax Court of Canada and the Canadian government121 as well as Canadian 
Who’s Who.122
Variables
The choice of variables is dictated by the three research questions as well as the 
pedagogical purpose of the project. Initially, a large number of variables was chosen; 
however, after two rounds of coding of the cases, some of those variables were 
dropped since they shed no light on the research questions. The case attributes col-
lected from the 37 cases include the characteristics of the taxpayers, the types of 
 116 Michelin Tires (Canada) Ltd. v. MNR (1995), 3 GTC 4040 (CITT).
 117 Ventes D’Auto Giordano Inc. v. The Queen, 2001 GTC 358 (TCC).
 118 For example, OGT Holdings, supra note 63; Husky Energy, supra note 62; and Canada Safeway, 
supra note 61.
 119 Global Equity Fund Ltd. v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 507; 1207192 Ontario Limited v. The Queen, 
2011 TCC 383; Triad Gestco Ltd. v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 259; Brent Kern Family Trust v. The 
Queen, 2012 TCC 358; McClarty Family Trust v. The Queen, 2012 TCC 80; MacDonald v. 
The Queen, 2012 TCC 123; and Spruce Credit Union v. The Queen, 2012 TCC 357.
 120 All references to “Miller” are to Campbell J. Miller (not Valerie Miller, who also currently 
serves on the Tax Court).
 121 Tax Court of Canada: www.tcc-cci.gc.ca. For recent judicial appointments, see www.justice.gc.ca/
eng/news-nouv/index.asp?tid=4. For archived judicial appointments, see www.collectionscanada 
.gc.ca/webarchives/20071116175956 or http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/index.asp?tid=4.
 122 See http://canadianwhoswho.ca/AboutPage.aspx.
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Judge (years on 
Tax Court)a
McNichol et al. v. The Queen 
97 DTC 111 1997 Yes Bonner (14)
RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc. et al. v. The Queen 
97 DTC 302 1997 Yes Bowman (6)
Husky Oil Limited v. The Queen 
99 DTC 308 1998 No Beaubier (8)
Jabs Construction Limited v. The Queen 
99 DTC 729 1999 No Bowman (8)
Nadeau v. The Queen 
99 DTC 324 1999 Yes Tardif (5)
OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen 
99 DTC 1044 1999 Yes Bowie (4)
Canadian Pacific Limited v. The Queen 
2000 DTC 2428 2000 No Bonner (17)
Donohue Forest Products Inc. v. The Queen 
2001 DTC 823 2001 No Archambault (9)
Duncan et al. v. The Queen 
2001 DTC 96 2001 Yes Bowie (6)
Fredette v. The Queen 
2001 DTC 621 2001 Yes Archambault (9)
Geransky v. The Queen 
2001 DTC 243 2001 No Bowman (10)
Jabin Investments Ltd. v. The Queen 
2001 DTC 1002 2001 No Hamlyn (11)
Rousseau-Houle v. The Queen 
2001 DTC 250 2001 No Archambault (9)
Hill v. The Queen 
2002 DTC 1749 2002 No Miller (1)
Imperial Oil Limited v. The Queen 
2002 DTC 1954 2002 No Mogan (14)
Mathew et al. v. The Queen 
2002 DTC 1637 2002 Yes Dussault (12)
Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. The Queen 
2003 TCC 215 2003 No Miller (2)
CIT Financial Ltd. v. The Queen 
2003 TCC 544 2003 No Bowman (12)
Loyens v. The Queen 
2003 TCC 214 2003 No Campbell (3)
Howe v. The Queen 
2004 TCC 719 2004 No Bell (13)
Brouillette c. La Reine 
2005 TCC 203 2005 No Lamarre Proulx (17)
Evans v. The Queen 
2005 TCC 684 2005 No Bowman (14)
Univar Canada Ltd. v. The Queen 
2005 TCC 723 2005 No Bell (14)
(Table 1 is concluded on the next page.)




Judge (years on 
Tax Court)a
Ceco Operations Ltd. v. The Queen 
2006 TCC 256 2006 Yes Bonner (23)
Desmarais v. The Queen 
2006 TCC 44 2006 Yes Archambault (14)
Lipson v. The Queen 
2006 TCC 148 2006 Yes Bowman (15)
MIL (Investments) SA v. The Queen 
2006 TCC 460 2006 No Bell (15)
Overs v. The Queen 
2006 TCC 26 2006 No Little (4)
Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen 
2007 TCC 481 2007 Yes Campbell (7)
MacKay v. The Queen 
2007 TCC 94 2007 No Campbell (7)
McMullen v. The Queen 
2007 TCC 16 2007 No Lamarre (14)
Landrus v. The Queen 
2008 TCC 274 2008 No Paris (6)
Remai v. The Queen 
2008 TCC 344 2008 No Rossiter (2)
Antle v. The Queen 
2009 TCC 465 2009 Yes Miller (8)
Collins & Aikman Products Co. v. The Queen 
2009 TCC 299 2009 No Boyle (2)
Garron Family Trust v. The Queen 
2009 TCC 450 2009 No Woods (6)
Lehigh Cement Limited v. The Queen 
2009 TCC 237 2009 Yes Mogan (21)
a Years on the court as at the time the case was decided.
tAble 1 Concluded
transactions, the kinds of tax benefits and avoidance transactions, and some aspects 
of the decision-making approaches used by Tax Court judges. Table 2 shows the 
variables in the case attributes data set.
The attributes of judges used in the analysis are as follows:
n	 gender,
n	 prior graduate studies,
n	 a proxy for prior professional experience (whether the judge was a founder 
of a law firm),
n	 a proxy for academic interests (prior teaching experience in law),
n	 a proxy for political leanings (the political party of the prime minister who ap-
pointed the judge), and
n	 a proxy for regional influences (work experience in Ontario, Quebec, or else-
where in Canada).
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tAble 2  Selected Case Attributes, GAAR Cases Decided 
at the Tax Court of Canada, 1997-2009
Category Variables
General information Year of decision









Transfer or sale of shares






Tax benefit Conceded by the taxpayer
Found by the court
Tax credits and exemptions
Tax deductions
Tax deferral
Avoidance transaction Conceded by the taxpayer
Found by the court
Series not in controversy
Series found under subsection 248(10)
Attention to time between transactions
Misuse or abuse Misuse and abuse tests applied
Only abuse test applied
Contextual and purposive interpretation applied
Extrinsic evidence considered




The data collection for the first data set and the coding of the variables were con-
ducted by the student authors of this article. Students worked in teams. Each GAAR 
case was independently coded by two students, and Jinyan Li checked the coding of 
all cases. The preliminary findings were presented to a group of invited tax practi-
tioners in the private and public sectors.
The research on the second data set was conducted by research assistants during 
the summer of 2011 under the supervision of Thaddeus Hwong. The second data 
set was added in response to suggestions made by invited participants at the above-
mentioned presentation.
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re se A rch Finding s
Exploration of Case Attributes—The Canada Trustco Effect
The exploration of the case attributes focuses on key aspects of the cases and the 
interaction between the kind of attributes in the GAAR-applied cases and the length 
of tenure of the Tax Court judges who decided these cases. The exploration pays 
special attention to the GAAR-applied cases in the post-Canada Trustco period be-
cause the findings with respect to these cases will be more relevant to the current 
legal environment.
To test the effect of Canada Trustco on the Tax Court’s decisions, we separated the 
cases decided before Canada Trustco (cases listed above Evans in table 1) and those 
decided after that decision. At first glance, the propensity for the Tax Court to apply 
GAAR seems to rise in the period after Canada Trustco, compared to the period be-
fore that decision. Before Canada Trustco, the court decided 21 GAAR cases and held 
that GAAR applied in 7 (33 percent) of those cases. After Canada Trustco, the court 
decided 16 GAAR cases and applied GAAR in 6 (38 percent) of those cases.
In addition, it appears that judges who had served on the Tax Court for a decade 
or more at the time of the decision were more likely to find in favour of GAAR after 
Canada Trustco. Before Canada Trustco, these more experienced judges held that 
GAAR applied in 2 out of 9 cases (22 percent), compared to 4 out of 8 cases (50 per-
cent) after Canada Trustco. Judges who had served on the Tax Court for less than a 
decade at the time of the decision applied GAAR in 5 out of 12 cases (42 percent) 
before Canada Trustco, compared to 2 out of 8 cases (25 percent) after Canada 
Trustco. All 3 GAAR-applied cases with a reassessed amount of $1 million or more in 
the post-Canada Trustco period also happened to have corporate taxpayers, as shown 
in table 3. Two of the 3 cases were decided by judges with more than two decades 
of experience on the Tax Court.
Amount of Reassessment
As shown in table 3, the GAAR-applied cases are divided roughly equally between 
cases with a reassessed amount of $1 million or more and those with a lower amount 
before and after Canada Trustco. Before Canada Trustco, the Tax Court decided 11 
GAAR cases with a reassessed amount of $1 million or more, finding that GAAR ap-
plied in 3 of them (27 percent). After Canada Trustco, the court decided 9 GAAR cases 
in this higher reassessment category, finding that GAAR applied in 3 of them (33 per-
cent). Among GAAR cases with a reassessed amount of less than $1 million, the court 
held that GAAR applied in 4 cases out of 10 (40 percent) before Canada Trustco and 
3 cases out of 7 (43 percent) after Canada Trustco.
Characteristics of Taxpayers
Most GAAR-applied cases have resident corporations or individuals. Before Canada 
Trustco, the Tax Court decided 13 GAAR cases with corporate taxpayers, finding that 
GAAR applied in 4 of them (31 percent). After Canada Trustco, the court decided 7 GAAR 
cases with corporate taxpayers, finding that GAAR applied in 3 of them (43 percent). 
For cases with individual taxpayers, before Canada Trustco the court decided 10 GAAR 
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cases involving such taxpayers, finding that GAAR applied in 5 of them (50 percent). 
After Canada Trustco, the court decided 10 GAAR cases with individual taxpayers, find-
ing that GAAR applied in 3 of them (30 percent).
With respect to other types of taxpayers, before Canada Trustco, the Tax Court 
decided no GAAR cases in which the taxpayer was a non-resident or a trust. After 
Canada Trustco, the court decided 5 GAAR cases with a non-resident taxpayer and 2 
GAAR cases with a trust as the taxpayer, finding that GAAR applied in 2 (40 percent) 
and 1 (50 percent) of those cases respectively.
Types of Transactions
Given that the data set includes only a small number of cases and a relatively wide 
variety of transactions, and that some cases may involve more than one type of 
transaction, it is difficult to offer a conjecture on the relationship between the types 
of transactions and the application of GAAR, or on any link between judicial experi-
ence on the Tax Court and transaction types. As shown in table 4, a transfer or sale 
of shares might be a candidate for a type of transaction that links to GAAR-applied 
cases, but if such a link exists, it has been weakened since Canada Trustco. Before 
Canada Trustco, the Tax Court decided 6 GAAR cases involving a transfer or sale of 
shares, finding that GAAR applied in 3 of them (50 percent). After Canada Trustco, the 
court decided 9 GAAR cases involving a transfer or sale of shares, finding that GAAR 
applied in 3 of them (33 percent). Similarly, for a property transfer to a partnership, 
before Canada Trustco, the court decided 7 GAAR cases, finding that GAAR applied in 
4 of them (57 percent); after Canada Trustco, the court decided 4 GAAR cases, finding 
that GAAR applied in 1 of them (25 percent).
Loss utilization seems to hold steady before and after Canada Trustco, but the 
number of cases decided in the latter period is too small to suggest any relationship. 
Before Canada Trustco, the court decided 9 GAAR cases involving loss utilization, 
finding that GAAR applied in 3 of them (33 percent). After Canada Trustco, the court 
decided 3 such cases, finding that GAAR applied in 1 of them (33 percent).
Acquisition of property seems to appear more often in GAAR-applied cases, but the 
post-Canada Trustco case number is again too small for us to infer any relationship. 
Before Canada Trustco, the court decided 7 GAAR cases involving an acquisition of 
property, finding that GAAR applied in 2 of them (29 percent). After Canada Trustco, 
the court decided 3 such cases, finding that GAAR applied in 2 of them (67 percent).
The post-Canada Trustco case numbers are also small for each of the remaining 
transaction types. The Tax Court held that GAAR applied in
n	 1 out of 4 cases (25 percent) involving the deduction of interest expense be-
fore Canada Trustco, and 1 out of 2 cases (50 percent) after Canada Trustco;
n	 3 out of 5 cases involving surplus stripping before Canada Trustco, and 1 out 
of 3 cases (33 percent) after Canada Trustco; and
n	 1 case (100 percent) involving a paid-up capital adjustment before Canada 
Trustco, and 1 out of 2 cases (50 percent) after Canada Trustco.
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Finally, as noted in table 4, one case (Lehigh Cement) fell into a separate category, 
being the only GAAR-applied case in the study period involving part XIII withhold-
ing tax on interest. That case was decided after Canada Trustco.
As mandated by the Supreme Court in Canada Trustco, the first step in the GAAR 
analysis is to determine whether there is a tax benefit arising from a transaction or 
a series of transactions of which the transaction is a part. Once it is determined that 
there is a tax benefit from a transaction or series of transactions, the second step in 
the GAAR analysis is to determine whether the transaction is an “avoidance trans-
action” within the meaning of subsection 245(3).123
Tax Benefits
According to the Supreme Court in Canada Trustco, the determination of whether 
there is a tax benefit is a factual matter, and the burden of proof is on the taxpayer.124 
A “tax benefit” is defined in subsection 245(1) to include not only the avoidance or 
reduction of tax, but also the deferral of tax. In most cases, the existence of a tax 
benefit is obvious. Of the 37 cases in the study, 35 had tax benefits (22 conceded by 
the taxpayer; 13 not conceded by the taxpayer but found by the Tax Court). The two 
exceptions are Brouillette and Univar. In Brouillette, where GAAR was not the main 
argument, the court held that section 245 did not apply, without analyzing the issue 
of a tax benefit. Univar is the only case that found no tax benefit.
Taxpayers appear to be more likely to concede the existence of a tax benefit since 
Canada Trustco. They did so in 11 out of 21 cases (52 percent) before Canada Trustco, 
compared to 11 out of 16 cases (69 percent) after Canada Trustco. Among the cases 
in which the taxpayer did not concede a tax benefit, a tax benefit was found in 9 out 
of 10 cases (90 percent) before Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in 2 of the 9 
(22 percent), and in 4 out of 5 cases (80 percent) after Canada Trustco, with GAAR 
applying in 2 of the 4 (50 percent).
The GAAR application rate seems to rise in cases where taxpayers did not concede 
a tax benefit in the post-Canada Trustco period. Where the taxpayer conceded a tax 
benefit, GAAR was applied in 5 out of 11 cases (46 percent) before Canada Trustco 
and 4 out of 11 cases (37 percent) after Canada Trustco. Where the taxpayer did not 
concede a tax benefit, GAAR was applied in 2 out of 10 cases (20 percent) before 
Canada Trustco and 2 out of 5 cases (40 percent) after Canada Trustco.
As shown in table 5, most of the GAAR-applied cases involved tax credits and 
exemptions and tax deductions. The Tax Court applied GAAR in 3 out of 4 cases 
involving tax credits and exemptions (75 percent) before Canada Trustco, and 4 out 
of 10 cases (40 percent) after Canada Trustco. The GAAR application rate held 
roughly steady after Canada Trustco in cases involving tax deductions and deferrals: 
for tax deductions, section 245 applied in 4 out of 17 cases (24 percent) before Can-
ada Trustco and 1 out of 5 cases (20 percent) after Canada Trustco; for tax deferrals, 
 123 See Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraphs 18-22.
 124 Ibid., at paragraph 63.
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tAble 5 Tax Benefits in GAAR-Applied Cases, Tax Court of Canada, 1997-2009
















McNichol 1997 Bonner (14) Yes Yes Yes
RMM 1997 Bowman (6) Yes Yes
Nadeau 1999 Tardif (5) Yes Yes
OSFC Holdings 1999 Bowie (4) Yes Yes
Duncan 2001 Bowie (6) Yes Yes
Fredette 2001 Archambault (9) Yes Yes Yes
Mathew 2002 Dussault (12) Yes Yes
Ceco 2006 Bonner (23) Yes Yes
Desmarais 2006 Archambault (14) Yes Yes Yes
Lipson 2006 Bowman (15) Yes Yes
Copthorne 2007 Campbell (7) Yes Yes
Antle 2009 Miller (8) Yes Yes
Lehigh Cement 2009 Mogan (21) Yes Yes
a Years on the court as at the time the case was decided.
section 245 applied in 2 out of 4 cases (50 percent) before Canada Trustco and 2 out 
of 3 cases (67 percent) after Canada Trustco.
Avoidance Transactions
Subsection 245(3) defines “avoidance transaction” to mean a transaction that results 
in a tax benefit, either alone or as part of a series of transactions, “unless the trans-
action may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily 
for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit.” As the Supreme Court 
stated in Canada Trustco, “[t]he function of this requirement is to remove from the 
ambit of the GAAR transactions or series of transactions that may reasonably be 
considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for a non-tax purpose.”125 
In the case of a series of transactions, if a single transaction in the series lacks a 
primary non-tax purpose, it is an avoidance transaction. The question of what con-
stitutes a “series” is important, since many tax-planning strategies involve a carefully 
structured sequence of transactions. Even if the primary purpose of the series is not 
tax avoidance, a particular transaction in the series may still constitute an avoidance 
transaction. GAAR may apply to deny the tax benefit if the transaction is found to 
constitute abusive tax avoidance under subsection 245(4). There is no need for every 
transaction in the series to be an avoidance transaction. Similar to the determina-
tion of a tax benefit, whether or not a transaction is an avoidance transaction is a 
question of fact, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proof.126
 125 Ibid., at paragraph 21.
 126 Ibid., at paragraph 63.
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In contrast to the concession of tax benefits, not many taxpayers readily admitted 
that the impugned transactions were avoidance transactions. Of the 35 cases with 
tax benefits, the taxpayer conceded the existence of an avoidance transaction in 9 
cases; of the remaining 26 cases, the Tax Court found the transaction to be an avoid-
ance transaction in 17 cases.
Taxpayers seem to be more willing to concede an avoidance transactions since Can-
ada Trustco. They did so in 4 out of 20 cases with tax benefits (20 percent) before 
Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in none of the 4, and in 5 out of 15 cases with 
tax benefits (33 percent) after Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in 3 of the 5 
(60 percent). Among the cases in which taxpayers did not concede an avoidance 
transaction, such a transaction was found in 11 out of 17 cases with tax benefits 
(65 percent) before Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in 7 of the 11 (64 percent), 
and in 6 out of 11 cases with tax benefits (55 percent) after Canada Trustco, with 
GAAR applying in 3 of the 6 (50 percent).
The question of a series of transactions was not a controversy in most GAAR cases: 
13 out of 20 cases with tax benefits (65 percent) before Canada Trustco and 11 out of 
15 cases with tax benefits (73 percent) after Canada Trustco. Among the cases in which 
GAAR applied, as shown in table 6, 3 were concerned with the question of a series.
Misuse or Abuse
The final step in the GAAR analysis is the two-stage misuse and abuse analysis: a 
textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation of the provisions that were relied 
upon by the taxpayer in obtaining the tax benefit; and a determination as to whether 
the avoidance transaction frustrates the purpose of those provisions.127
Of the 26 cases with avoidance transactions, misuse and/or abuse was found in 
13 (50 percent): 7 out of 15 cases (47 percent) before Canada Trustco, and 6 out of 
11 cases (55 percent) after Canada Trustco. The Tax Court applied both abuse and 
misuse tests in 8 out of 15 cases with avoidance transactions (53 percent) before 
Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in 3 of the 8 (38 percent), and 7 out of 11 such 
cases (64 percent) after Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in 3 of the 7 (43 percent). 
Of the remaining 11 cases with avoidance transactions, the court applied only the 
abuse test in 4 out of 6 cases (67 percent) before Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying 
in all 4 (100 percent), and in 4 out of 4 cases (100 percent) after Canada Trustco, with 
GAAR applying in 3 of the 4 (75 percent). (See table 7.) The court applied the misuse 
test only in Donohue,128 a decision that preceded Canada Trustco and in which GAAR 
was not applied.
Of the 26 cases with avoidance transactions, the Tax Court adopted a contextual 
and purposive interpretation of statutory provisions in 5 out of 15 cases (33 percent) 
before Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in 1 of the 5 (20 percent), and in 7 out of 11 
cases (64 percent) after Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in 4 of the 7 (57 percent).
 127 Ibid., at paragraphs 36-43 et seq.
 128 Donohue Forest Products Inc. v. The Queen, 2001 DTC 823; aff ’d. 2002 FCA 422.
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With respect to materials considered by the Tax Court, both extrinsic evidence 
and the scheme of the Act were considered in 7 out of 15 cases with avoidance trans-
actions (47 percent) before Canada Trustco and 7 out of 11 cases (64 percent) after 
Canada Trustco. As shown in table 7, in cases where extrinsic evidence was consid-
ered, GAAR was applied in 3 of the 7 cases (43 percent) before Canada Trustco and 5 
of the 7 cases (71 percent) after Canada Trustco. In cases where the scheme of the Act 
was considered, GAAR was applied in 4 of the 7 cases (57 percent) before Canada 
Trustco and 3 of the 7 cases (43 percent) after Canada Trustco.
The Tax Court considered legal history in 4 out of 15 cases with avoidance 
transactions (27 percent) before Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in 1 of the 4 
(25 percent), and in 4 out of 11 cases (36 percent) after Canada Trustco, with GAAR 
applying in 2 of the 4 (50 percent). The court did not consider explanatory notes in 
many cases: 2 out of 15 cases with avoidance transactions (13 percent) before Canada 
Trustco, with GAAR applying in neither of those cases, and 3 out of 11 cases (27 per-
cent) after Canada Trustco, with GAAR applying in all 3 (100 percent).
Exploration of Judicial Attributes
As described above, the 37 GAAR cases in this study were decided by 19 Tax Court 
judges. Among the judges, 6 decided only cases in the pre-Canada Trustco era, while 
6 decided only cases in the post-Canada Trustco era. The 7 judges who decided cases 
in both periods are Archambault J (3 pre-Canada Trustco; 1 post-Canada Trustco), 
Bell J (1; 2), Bonner J (2; 1), Bowman J (4; 2), Campbell J (1; 2), Miller J (2; 1), and 
Mogan J (1; 1).
Voting Record
As shown in table 8, Bowman J decided the most GAAR cases—a total of 6. Most of 
the judges decided only one GAAR case—11 of 19 belong to this group. No judge 
ruled that GAAR applied in more than two cases. Bowman J is in this group (applying 
GAAR in 2 of his 6 cases) along with Archambault J (2 out of 4), Bonner J (2 out of 3), 
and Bowie J (2 out of 2). Bowman J had the most cases in which GAAR was not applied 
(4 out of 6), while Bell J held that GAAR did not apply in any of his three cases.
Personal and Societal Attributes of Judges
Data on the attributes of the individual judges are set out in table 9 and discussed 
further below.
gender
Fifteen of the 19 judges are men, and most of the GAAR-applied cases were decided 
by male judges: all 7 of the cases before Canada Trustco, and 5 out of 6 of the cases 
after Canada Trustco. Before Canada Trustco, 19 of the 21 GAAR cases were decided 
by male judges, and, as noted, GAAR was applied in 7 of those cases. Thus, it follows 
that the remaining 2 cases were decided by female judges, who held that GAAR did 
not apply in either case. Twelve of the 16 cases decided after Canada Trustco were 
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Bowman 1991 (2008) 6 2 4 1 2 1
Archambault 1992 4 2 3 1 1 1
Bonner 1983 (2006) 3 2 2 1 1 1
Miller 2001 3 1 2 0 1 1
Campbell 2000 3 1 1 0 2 1
Bowie 1995 2 2 2 2 0 0
Mogan 1988 (2004) 2 1 1 0 1 1
Dussault 1990 (2006) 1 1 1 1 0 0
Tardif 1994 1 1 1 1 0 0
Bell 1991 (2006) 3 0 1 0 2 0
Beaubier 1990 (2007) 1 0 1 0 0 0
Hamlyn 1990 (2002) 1 0 1 0 0 0
Lamarre Proulx 1988 (2008) 1 0 1 0 0 0
Lamarre 1993 1 0 0 0 1 0
Little 2002 1 0 0 0 1 0
Paris 2002 1 0 0 0 1 0
Woods 2003 1 0 0 0 1 0
Rossiter 2006 1 0 0 0 1 0
Boyle 2007 1 0 0 0 1 0
a Judges are separated into two groups: the first group includes those who applied GAAR in one 
or more cases; the second group includes judges who applied GAAR in none of their cases.
decided by male judges, with GAAR applying in 5 of those cases. Of the 4 remaining 
cases decided by female judges, GAAR was applied in 1 case.
graduate studies
Twelve of the 19 judges did not go to graduate school, and most of the GAAR-applied 
cases were decided by such judges. Before Canada Trustco, 15 of the 21 cases were 
decided by judges with no background in graduate studies, and GAAR was applied in 
6 of those cases. Of the remaining 6 cases, decided by judges with such background, 
GAAR was applied in 1 case. After Canada Trustco, 11 of the 16 cases were decided by 
judges with no graduate studies background, and GAAR was applied in 4 of those 
cases. Of the remaining 5 cases, decided by judges with such background, GAAR was 
applied in 2 of those cases.
prior professional experience
Thirteen of the 19 judges had not founded a law firm before being appointed to the 
court, and most of the GAAR-applied cases were decided by judges in this group: 6 out 
of 7 cases before Canada Trustco, and 4 out of 6 cases after Canada Trustco. Before 
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Canada Trustco, 13 of the 21 cases were decided by judges who had not founded a 
law firm, and, as noted, GAAR was applied in 6 of those cases. Of the remaining 8 
cases decided by judges who had founded a law firm, GAAR was applied in 1 case. 
After Canada Trustco, 9 of the 16 cases were decided by judges who had not founded 
a law firm, with GAAR applying in 4 of those cases. Of the remaining 7 cases decided by 
judges who had founded their own law firm, GAAR was applied in 2 of those cases.
law Teaching experience
Eight of the 19 judges had prior experience teaching law on a full-time or part-time 
basis. More GAAR-applied cases were decided by judges with law teaching experi-
ence after Canada Trustco than before Canada Trustco: 4 out of 6 cases after Canada 
Trustco, and 3 out of 7 cases before Canada Trustco. Before Canada Trustco, 13 of the 
21 cases were decided by judges with law teaching experience, and GAAR was applied 
in 3 of those cases. Of the remaining 8 cases decided by judges without law teaching 
experience, GAAR was applied in 4 of those cases. After Canada Trustco, 8 of the 16 
cases were decided by judges with law teaching experience, and GAAR was applied in 
4 of those cases. Of the remaining 8 cases decided by judges without law teaching 
experience, GAAR was applied in 2 of those cases.
political Ties
Eight of the 19 judges were appointed by a Liberal prime minister, and about half 
of the GAAR-applied cases were decided by judges in this group: 4 out of 7 cases be-
fore Canada Trustco, and 3 out of 6 cases after Canada Trustco. Before Canada Trustco, 
8 of the 21 cases were decided by judges appointed by a Liberal prime minister, and, 
as noted, GAAR was applied in 4 of those cases. Of the remaining 13 cases decided 
by judges appointed by a Progressive Conservative/Conservative prime minister, 
GAAR was applied in 3 of those cases. After Canada Trustco, 7 of the 16 cases were 
decided by judges appointed by a Liberal prime minister, with GAAR applying in 3 of 
those cases. Of the remaining 9 cases decided by judges appointed by a Progressive 
Conservative/Conservative prime minister, GAAR was applied in 3 of those cases.
regional Ties
Seven of the 19 judges had ties to Ontario and 5 had ties to Quebec, with the re-
maining 7 having ties to other provinces or regions of Canada; yet at least half of 
the GAAR-applied cases were decided by judges with regional ties to Ontario: before 
Canada Trustco, 4 out of 7 cases, and after Canada Trustco, 3 out of 6 cases. Most of the 
pre-Canada Trustco cases were decided by judges with ties to Ontario: 10 out of 21 
cases, with GAAR applying in 4 of those cases. Of the remaining 11 cases, 6 were 
decided by judges with ties to Quebec, with GAAR applying in 3 of those cases, and 
5 by judges with ties to other parts of Canada, with GAAR applying in none of those 
cases. Eight of the 16 post-Canada Trustco cases were decided by judges with regional 
ties outside Ontario and Quebec, with GAAR applying in 2 of those cases. Of the 
remaining 8 post-Canada Trustco cases, 6 were decided by judges with ties to Ontario, 
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with GAAR applying in 3 of those cases, and 2 were decided by judges with ties to 
Quebec, with GAAR applying in 1 case.
Linking Case Outcomes and the Attributes of Judges
To explore possible linkages between the attributes of judges and the case outcomes, 
cumulative averages of the application of GAAR by the Tax Court and by judges who 
have particular personal and societal attributes are presented side by side, as shown 
in table 10. All attributes selected on the basis of the exploratory analysis above fit 
the ebb and flow of the Tax Court’s GAAR application rate before and after the re-
lease of Canada Trustco in 2005—a dip, followed by a bounce. All except one of the 
selected attributes—law teaching experience—end the study period with cumulative 
averages of GAAR application rates higher than that of the Tax Court, and hence 
they could be considered dominant attributes at this point in the evolution of the 
jurisprudence. Law teaching experience is currently on the margin, on the basis of 
the very small set of GAAR cases available for this study, but as more cases are de-
cided, the attribute profile may change in the future.
In addition to trying to ascertain the dominance of selected attributes, our ex-
ploratory analysis opens the door to further conjecture and paves the way for future 
research when more GAAR cases become available. Several judges in our study who 
possess certain attributes are not among the majority in this respect but have more 
than their proportionate share of cases in which GAAR has been applied. From this 
vantage point, a number of attributes—in particular, law teaching experience, polit-
ical ties, and regional ties—appear to be prime targets for future research on sources 
of minority influence on judicial decision making in GAAR cases. More specifically, 
judges who have law teaching experience, were appointed by a Liberal prime min-
ister, and have ties to Ontario seem to be candidates for a higher propensity to find 
that GAAR applies.
Combining the observations from the exploration of the case attributes and the 
judicial attributes, a back test using the existing post-Canada Trustco data can be 
performed. Of cases with at least one of the following three case attributes—a 
reassessment amount of $1 million or more, a corporate taxpayer, or a tax benefit 
involving tax credits and/or exemptions—there is a 50:50 split on GAAR decisions 
between judges with either Liberal or Ontario ties. Bonner, Miller, and Mogan JJ 
applied GAAR in such cases, while Bowman, Boyle, and Woods JJ did not apply 
GAAR, and Campbell J had a 1:1 record.
Answering the Research Questions
The above data analysis provides some, albeit not definitive, evidence to answer the 
three research questions.
To what extent has gaar been a game changer in terms of how courts 
approach tax-avoidance cases?
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There is some statistical evidence that supports the conclusion that GAAR has been 
a game changer to some extent. In post-2005 cases that held that GAAR applied, the 
Tax Court more frequently turned to contextual and purposive interpretation, and 
the consideration of legislative history and explanatory notes (see table 7). This 
coincides with the Canada Trustco effect. Post-2010 Tax Court cases appear to confirm 
the trend of moving away from literal interpretation. For example, the legislative 
scheme and history were considered in Triad Gestco, 1207192 Ontario Limited, and 
Global Equity Fund Ltd.129 Furthermore, judges who had served on the Tax Court for 
a decade or more at the time of the decision seemed more likely to rule in favour of 
GAAR after Canada Trustco (see table 9).
are elements of certainty emerging in the application of gaar?
The statistical results of case attributes indicate that
n	 GAAR has been fairly consistently applied to loss utilization but not to other 
types of transactions;
n	 the existence of a tax benefit is admitted by the taxpayer in most cases;
n	 when the taxpayer does not concede the existence of a tax benefit, the GAAR 
application rate tends to rise;
n	 taxpayers seem to be more willing to concede the existence of an avoidance 
transaction since Canada Trustco; and
n	 the existence of a series of transactions is generally not a controversial issue.
The research findings confirm that the only certainty is the unpredictability of the 
case outcome at the Tax Court. This is what we would expect, since neither the tax-
payer nor the Crown would waste time and money going to court if the outcome 
were clearly predictable.
Is there a smell test?
The empirical findings support a qualified “yes” in answer to this question. An 
abuse analysis was required in 26 out of the 37 cases. Not many of these cases con-
sidered legislative history, extrinsic materials, the scheme of the Act, or explanatory 
notes. Many of the cases, especially those that predate Canada Trustco, reached a 
conclusion without careful deliberation on the purpose of the provisions of the Act 
or the Act read as a whole, and without a reasoned discussion of why the impugned 
avoidance transaction was considered to be abusive or not. Moreover, in some cases, 
it seems that the particular judge who hears the appeal may affect the outcome. For 
example, as noted earlier, Bell J never ruled in favour of applying GAAR, and Bowie J 
never ruled against it. This intuitively confirms that some sort of smell test is at play.
 129 See supra note 119.
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On the basis of an exploratory analysis of the data on judges’ attributes, a judge’s 
sense of “fiscal morality” appears to be influenced by his or her experience on the Tax 
Court, gender, prior graduate studies, law teaching experience, experience of found-
ing a law firm, regional ties, and/or the political party making the appointment. Our 
analysis suggests that a judge with any combination of the following attributes—
male, with no background in graduate studies, who previously taught law, who was 
not a founder of a law firm, who has Ontario ties, and who was appointed by a 
Liberal prime minister—may be more likely to apply GAAR since the decision in 
Canada Trustco. We believe it will be worthwhile to examine these attributes further 
when more cases become available.
limitAtio ns A nd imPlic Atio ns
Limitations
Our study provides a statistical overview of the GAAR decisions by the Tax Court 
from 1997 through 2009 and the background of judges who made those decisions. 
Our findings may confirm certain conclusions that others had already drawn regard-
ing GAAR cases at the Tax Court, but may also provide some new insights. Before 
discussing the potential implications of our study, we would like to point out some 
limitations of those findings.
First, the number of cases—37—provides a very small data set for empirical an-
alysis of this kind. Because the cases were decided by 19 different judges, we can only 
speculate about the factors that influenced their decisions, and the extent to which 
individual judges may apply a smell test in their decision making in GAAR cases.
Second, each case is different, and that makes the challenge of drawing general-
ized conclusions even more difficult.
Third, the research is limited to the published decisions. The data set does not 
include the materials filed with the court by the parties or transcripts of the court 
hearings. In addition, the overview based on the quantitative data was not further 
explored by qualitative analysis. In particular, no formal interviews were conducted 
with any of the judges, including Donald Bowman (although he did share his in-
sights about GAAR with the study group).
However, the study offers hope for the future: as the body of case law grows, more 
data will become available for further analysis. Building on this initial experience in 
conducting an empirical analysis of GAAR cases, a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods can be used to analyze future data in a more nuanced way. With 
better analyses in the future, the tax community and the judiciary will be better 
informed.
Smell Tests and Statutory Interpretation
The research findings confirm that judicial uncertainty is a reality. At the same time, 
GAAR is increasingly grounded in statutory interpretation. It is true that facts matter 
in GAAR cases. The existence of a tax benefit and an avoidance transaction are ques-
tions of fact, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proof. Less than a third of the 
362  n  canadian tax journal / revue fiscale canadienne (2013) 61:2
GAAR cases were resolved when the taxpayer successfully refuted these questions. 
However, 26 of 37 cases moved on to the misuse or abuse stage, which is primarily 
an exercise in statutory interpretation. After the Supreme Court of Canada’s deci-
sion in Canada Trustco, Tax Court judges paid more attention to a contextual and 
purposive interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act. With the additional 
guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Copthorne, this trend is expected to 
continue.
Red Flags for GAAR
Our quantitative research does not focus on identifying red flags for GAAR. How-
ever, after studying the 37 Tax Court decisions up to 2010, post-2010 Tax Court 
decisions, and GAAR decisions at the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court of Canada, it is possible to observe some trends or patterns emerging.
With respect to types of transactions,130 GAAR has been found to apply to
n	 loss transfers (Mathew, MacKay131);
n	 synthetic losses (Triad Gestco, 1207192 Ontario Limited);
n	 “naked surplus strip” transactions132 (McNichol, Desmarais);
n	 Quebec shuffle or interprovincial tax arbitrage (OGT Holdings) (but not the 
“Ontario shuffles” in Husky Energy and Canada Safeway);
n	 duplication of paid-up capital (Copthorne);133 and
n	 spousal rollover and mortgage transactions (Lipson).
GAAR has been found not to apply to transactions known as
n	 sale-leaseback (Canada Trustco);
n	 surplus strip plus income splitting (Evans);
n	 treaty shopping (MIL Investments);134
 130 For further discussion of the grouping of GAAR cases, see Powrie, supra note 6; Bowman et 
al., ibid.; and Kroft and Olsen, ibid.
 131 MacKay v. The Queen, 2007 TCC 94; rev’d. 2008 FCA 105.
 132 Powrie, supra note 6. 
 133 GAAR was found not to apply in Collins & Aikman, supra note 59.
 134 Canada v. MIL (Investments) SA, 2007 FCA 236; aff ’g. MIL (Investments) SA, supra note 80. In 
Garron, supra note 68, GAAR was an alternative argument. The Federal Court of Appeal held 
that GAAR would not apply if the trust were found to be resident in Barbados. The Supreme 
Court of Canada did not consider this argument after finding that the trusts were resident in 
Canada, not Barbados, under common-law principles. But the Supreme Court made it clear 
that it should not be understood as endorsing the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal on 
those matters. It should be noted that GAAR was not argued in two recent treaty-shopping 
cases—Canada v. Prévost Car Inc., 2009 FCA 57; aff ’g. 2008 TCC 231; and Velcro Canada Inc. v. 
The Queen, 2012 TCC 57—where the arguments were centred on the meaning of “beneficial 
ownership.” For further discussion on GAAR and treaty shopping, see Kimberly Brown, “Tax 
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n	 tiered financing (Univar);
n	 interest-coupon stripping (Lehigh Cement);
n	 capital gain strip or hybrid asset and share sales (Geransky, Donohue, McMul-
len);135 and
n	 recognition of a terminal loss (Landrus).
With respect to tax attributes, GAAR has been found to apply to transactions that 
involve
n	 tax attribute trading (Mathew, MacKay);
n	 tax attribute importation (Duncan);136
n	 tax attribute exportation (OGT Holdings, Antle); and
n	 double-counting of tax attributes (Copthorne).
GAAR has been found not to apply to
n	 transactions that created tax attributes (Canada Trustco, Lehigh Cement); and
n	 transactions that resulted in the realization of a tax attribute (terminal loss 
recognition in Landrus).
Some factors that are alleged by the government to be indicators of abusive tax 
avoidance have been rejected as being not significant or not relevant. For example, 
Canada Trustco establishes that the complexity of transactions and the involvement 
of indifferent third parties should not, in themselves, “tweak the nose upward” on 
the smell test.137 Similarly, the fact that the transactions were designed to operate 
like clockwork has been found to be irrelevant. Bowman CJ stated in Evans:
I do not think that it can be said that there is an abuse of the provisions of the Act 
where each section operates exactly the way it is supposed to. The Crown’s position 
seems to be predicated on the view that since everything worked like clockwork there 
Treaty Shopping and the GAAR: MIL (Investments) S.A. v. The Queen” (2008) 66:1 University 
of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 33-63; Nathalie Goyette, “Tax Treaty Abuse: A Second Look” 
(2003) 51:2 Canadian Tax Journal 764-805; and Matias Milet and Peter Repetto, “Canada-U.S. 
Tax Treaty Issues: Anti-Hybrid Rules, the GAAR, and the U.S. Dual Consolidated Loss Rules” 
(2011) 63:12 Tax Notes International 889-901.
 135 McMullen v. The Queen, 2007 TCC 16.
 136 Duncan et al. v. The Queen, 2001 DTC 96 (TCC); aff ’d. 2002 DTC 7172 (FCA) (sub nom. 
Water’s Edge Village Estates (Phase II) Ltd. v. The Queen).
 137 Miller J stated in Canada Trustco, supra note 27, at paragraph 93, “This is one of those paradoxes 
where the sheer complexity of the series of transactions involving many players tweaks the nose 
upward on that least scientific of analysis known, in tax vernacular, as the smell test, yet 
legislation and case precedent guide analysis down a more structured and deliberate path past 
the olfactory sense and into the more certain realm of reason, though less precise purview of 
policy, where the GAAR debate, in this case, rages.”
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must have been an abuse. The answer to this position is, of course, that if everything 
had not worked like clockwork we would not be here.138
Similarly, a taxpayer’s motivation to minimize tax is irrelevant. For example, 
LeBel J stated in Lipson that an avoidance purpose is needed to establish a violation 
of GAAR when subsection 245(3) is in issue, but is not determinative in the subsec-
tion 245(4) analysis.139 The lack of economic substance is not, on its own, sufficient 
basis for finding abuse.140 The potential loss of tax revenue is not a factor in GAAR 
decisions. However, the concern with the relative ease of duplicating avoidance 
transactions in the current business environment presumably underlies the decisions 
in Mathew, Lipson, and Copthorne.
Appeals of Tax Court Decisions
Our findings confirm that the Tax Court of Canada plays an important role in in-
terpreting GAAR. As shown in table 11, only two GAAR decisions of the Tax Court 
have been overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal (by Sharlow J in both cases) 
and none have been overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada. Of the 37 Tax 
Court decisions, 18 were appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal. Among the 18 
appealed decisions, GAAR was applied in 6 cases, and the decisions were appealed by 
the taxpayer. Of the 9 pre-Canada Trustco cases, 6 were decided by judges with at 
least a decade on the Tax Court at the time of the decision. Of the 9 post-Canada 
Trustco cases, only 3 were decided by judges with such experience.
Our findings also indicate that the preappointment experience of the judges mat-
ters, gender matters, and expertise matters. One implication of these findings is that 
the Tax Court may consider strengthening the development of expertise in GAAR 
through assigning cases or training. Another implication is to appoint judges with 
more diverse backgrounds, including gender.
In addition, we wish to note that some judges stand out in their influence on the 
development of GAAR jurisprudence. Bowman J decided the largest number of GAAR 
cases and was never overturned by an appellate court. As noted above, Sharlow J 
wrote the only two Federal Court of Appeal decisions that overturned Tax Court 
decisions, and both were written after the Supreme Court had signalled in Canada 
Trustco that appellate tribunals should not interfere with a decision of that court—
absent a palpable and overriding error—provided that the Tax Court judge has 
proceeded on a proper construction of the provisions of the Act and on findings 
supported by the evidence.141 Rothstein J wrote the first Federal Court of Appeal 
decision on GAAR in OSFC Holdings, setting the standard for analyzing GAAR until 
 138 Evans, supra note 55, at paragraph 29.
 139 Lipson, supra note 18, at paragraph 38.
 140 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 60.
 141 Ibid., at paragraph 46.
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tAble 11 Appeals of Tax Court of Canada Decisions in GAAR Cases, 1997-2009
Case Year
Judge (years on 
Tax Court)a
GAAR applied 













OSFC Holdings 1999 Bowie (4) Yes No
Canadian Pacific 2000 Bonner (17) No No
Duncan 2001 Bowie (6) Yes No
Donohue 2001 Archambault (9) No No
Jabin Investments 2001 Hamlyn (11) No No
Imperial Oil 2002 Mogan (14) No No
Mathew 2002 Dussault (12) Yes No No
Canada Trustco 2003 Miller (2) No No No
CIT Financial 2003 Bowman (12) No No
MIL 2006 Bell (15) No No
Lipson 2006 Bowman (15) Yes No No
Copthorne 2007 Campbell (7) Yes No No
MacKay 2007 Campbell (7) No Yes
Landrus 2008 Paris (6) No No
Remai 2008 Rossiter (2) No No
Collins & Aikman 2009 Boyle (2) No No
Garron 2009 Woods (6) No No Nob
Lehigh Cement 2009 Mogan (21) Yes Yes
a Years on the court as at the time the case was decided.   
b GAAR was not a main issue in the appeal, and the Supreme Court declined to address it.
the Supreme Court’s decision in Canada Trustco and its most recent decision in 
Copthorne.
sK e tching the big Pic t ure 
while  lo o K ing Fo rwA rd
Our exploratory study is, we hope, a small step on the long road to a full understand-
ing of the scope of GAAR in action, and the relationship between judges’ attributes 
and their judicial decisions on GAAR. The study confirms that GAAR is indeed a 
game changer, but a modest one. Between 1988 and 2010, there were only 37 Tax 
Court decisions on GAAR, fewer than two per year. The initial anxiety about the 
uncertainty of GAAR was not translated into a large number of court challenges over 
the use of GAAR by the government. The GAAR-mandated shift toward purposive 
characterization of transactions and statutory interpretation is steady and slow. Even 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Canada Trustco, Tax Court judges did not 
carefully follow the textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation approach in 
about one-third of the cases. The economic substance of transactions was ruled out 
by the Supreme Court as a relevant factor in general and was not carefully consid-
ered as a basis for finding abuse in any GAAR cases. The fact that the Supreme Court 
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was asked to pronounce on whether or not GAAR applies to the highly synthetic 
transactions in Copthorne means that the game of tax planning is affected (though 
not changed) by the GAAR trump card. The influence of judicial experience with 
GAAR is limited, since many Tax Court judges decided only one GAAR case. Judicial 
uncertainty remains. There is no reason to doubt that judicial decision making will 
continue to evolve and shape the scope of GAAR in action.
Our experience with this modest, exploratory empirical study shows that such a 
line of inquiry requires a combination of technical knowledge about the targeted 
area of law and creativity in empirical research design. The relationship between the 
two is symbiotic yet synergistic, and the execution is more art than science. Although 
our study provides some conjectures on some of the “big picture” questions, the 
implications of our findings should not be exaggerated, owing to the small data set. 
On the basis of the exploration of case attributes, interesting questions emerge for 
future research when more cases become available for analysis. The GAAR applica-
tion rate appears to rise more for cases with a reassessment amount of $1 million or 
more in the post-Canada Trustco period, and to increase for cases with corporate 
taxpayers in the period. Also, the jury is still out on whether the Tax Court may be 
more or less inclined to hold that GAAR applies in cases involving tax credits and 
exemptions after Canada Trustco (with a lower GAAR application rate of 40 percent 
compared to 75 percent before Canada Trustco, but as a feature of 67 percent [4 out 
of 6] post-Canada Trustco cases in which GAAR applied). These notions are good 
candidates to be tested with more case data in future empirical studies. We are 
hopeful that future research will bear more fruit as the number of cases grows with 
the passage of time.
